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SOCIAL SUPPORT FOR TERRORISTS:
FACEBOOK’S “FRIEND SUGGESTION” ALGORITHM,
SECTION 230 IMMUNITY, MATERIAL SUPPORT FOR
TERRORISTS, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
By Ellen Smith Yost1
Victims of international terrorism have recently argued that
Facebook incurs civil liability under the material support provisions of
the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) when its “friend suggestion” computer
algorithm mines user data, identifies radicalized users with an interest
in terrorism, and suggests that these users become “friends” with
terrorist groups like Hamas that communicate over the platform.
Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (Section 230),
social media companies like Facebook are currently immune from most
“material support to terrorists” claims. But material support claims
based on Facebook’s algorithms are novel and different. This article
considers, for the first time, the statutory and constitutional hurdles
facing plaintiffs bringing algorithmic material support claims. Section
230 reform is currently the subject of intense regulatory and legislative
interest. A terrorism carve-out is one proposed reform. For this reason,
it is increasingly important for social media companies, litigants,
courts, and Congress to understand the intersecting statutory and
constitutional issues presented by algorithmic material support claims.
First, such plaintiffs face the statutory hurdle posed by Section
230. Currently, circuits are split on the existence and scope of
immunity granted by Section 230. The limited “definitional”
interpretation of § 230(c)(1) favored by the Seventh Circuit, unlike the
broad “immunity” approach currently favored by many circuits,
appropriately balances the competing policy concerns reflected in
Section 230 and in statutes like the ATA. The definitional approach to
Section 230 does not bar algorithmic material support claims against
social media platforms. Next, plaintiffs face a statutory hurdle posed
by the ATA’s proximate causation requirement. Social media
companies that worry about a flood of material support claims if
Section 230 immunity is scaled back by Congress or the courts should
find this hurdle’s presence reassuring. The ATA’s proximate cause
requirement will bar all but the strongest, most meritorious
algorithmic material support claims—an outcome that is fair to
1

JD Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, 2021. The author would like to
express her gratitude to Jeffrey Kahn, Altshuler Distinguished Teaching
Professor and Professor of Law at SMU Dedman School of Law, for his
support and comments on a draft of this article. Any errors are the author’s
alone.
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plaintiffs and to social media companies. Finally, if algorithmic
material support claims are not statutorily barred, they are likely
barred by the First Amendment. As the work of First Amendment
scholar Stuart Minor Benjamin suggests, Facebook’s friend suggestion
algorithm is likely to be protected speech. Under the Supreme Court’s
decision in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, the civil provisions
of the Anti-Terrorism Act therefore could not be constitutionally
applied to this algorithmic speech, no matter how meritorious the
claim.
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INTRODUCTION: FORCE V. FACEBOOK
A client tells you her tragic story.2 A U.S. citizen, she lives in
Israel. One terrible day, as she disembarked at a Jerusalem rail station
with her three-month-old daughter, a member of the Palestinian
terrorist group Hamas rammed his vehicle into the crowd, violently
striking the baby’s stroller and its helpless occupant. The baby died two
hours later. Seeking justice and compensation for your client, you
consider who might bear civil liability under U.S. law for this heinous
attack. The attacker himself was killed and had, in any case, no money.
You can sue Hamas under the civil damages provision of the AntiTerrorism Act (ATA).3 But collecting damages from a foreign terrorist
group is difficult to impossible.4 Fortunately, your client can also assert
civil claims under the ATA against any U.S. entity that has provided
material support to Hamas.5 The social media company Facebook
arguably provides such support and is a tempting target.6 Of course,
you need to understand your likelihood of success on such a claim. To
do this, you must answer these questions: Is Facebook potentially liable
to victims of terrorism, under the statute criminalizing material support
to terrorists, when the company’s algorithms enable the responsible
terrorist group’s actions by introducing it to potential new members?
Or is the company exempt from liability under either Section 230 of
the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA) or the First
Amendment?

2

Sadly, this hypothetical scenario is based on the tragic death of Chaya Zissel
Braun. Braun’s family were among the plaintiffs in Force v. Facebook, Inc.,
934 F.3d 53, 57–58 (2d Cir. 2019).
3
See, e.g., Rubin v. Hamas-Islamic Resistance Movement, No. CIV. A. 020975 (RMU), 2004 WL 2216489, at *4 (D.D.C. 2004) (granting default
judgement and damages to victims of Hamas terrorist attack). Our
hypothetical attorney can also sue state sponsors of Hamas’ terrorism under §
1605A of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). See also Braun v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 228 F. Supp. 3d 64, 87 (D.D.C. 2017) (ordering Iran
and Syria to pay $178,500,000 in damages to the family of Chaya Zissel
Braun).
4
See, e.g., Mica Rosenberg, Suing Governments over Terror no Sure Thing
Despite U.S. September 11 Law, REUTERS (Sept. 29, 2016),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-sept11-lawsuits-analysis/suinggovernments-over-terror-no-sure-thing-despite-u-s-september-11-lawidUSKCN11Z326.
5
See, e.g., Force, 934 F.3d at 61.
6
See id.
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The Supreme Court recently declined an opportunity to
address these questions in Force v. Facebook.7 This was a mistake. The
questions above implicate some of the most important legal and social
issues facing U.S. society today, like how to balance free speech,
liability, and harm in online forums; and how legal structures can
provide incentive for internet companies to safeguard users and third
parties while ensuring these companies have freedom to innovate and
thrive in a competitive global marketplace. For this reason, the Court
should take its earliest opportunity to decide the scope of Section 230
and its relationship to the Anti-Terrorism Act and other statutes. This
article tackles the questions the Court should have answered in Force.
As Section 230 is currently the subject of intense regulatory,
legislative, and scholarly interest, and a terrorism carve-out is one of
several recently proposed reforms to Section 230, it is increasingly
important that litigants, courts, and Congress understand these
interrelated issues.8
In Force, U.S. citizens who lost loved ones in Hamas terrorist
attacks sought civil damages from Facebook, which they claimed
unlawfully provided material support to a designated foreign terrorist
organization and its murderous members.9 The Force plaintiffs based
their claims on provisions of the ATA found at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2333,
2339A, and 2339B.10 The Second Circuit rejected these claims,
granting Facebook’s Motion to Dismiss and finding that Facebook was
immunized from such suits under Section 230(c)(1) of the CDA.11
Section 230(c)(1) provides that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
information provided by another information content provider,” which
courts including the Second Circuit interpret as providing companies
like Facebook immunity from many civil claims.12
7

Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct.
2761 (2020) (mem.).
8
See infra notes 236, 237, 238 and accompanying text.
9
See Force, 934 F.3d at 57.
10
See infra Section II. C. notes and accompanying text.
11
See Force, 934 F.3d at 57; 47 U.S.C. § 230; The “Communications Decency
Act,” was enacted in 1996. See Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-104, tit. V, § 509, 110 Stat. 137, 138–39 (1996); see generally JEFF
KOSSEFF, THE TWENTY-SIX WORDS THAT CREATED THE INTERNET (2019).
12
See, e.g., Force, 934 F.3d at 63–64; see also Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129
F.3d 327, 330–31 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937 (1998). However,
§ 230 provides no defense to criminal liability under the ATA. 47 U.S.C. §
230(e)(1) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to impair the
enforcement of . . . any other Federal criminal statute.”). So, the government
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So far as the Second Circuit’s decision applies Section 230 to
civil material support claims based on social media content posted by
Hamas or its members, the result is uncontroversial.13 However, the
Force plaintiffs also brought novel claims based on Facebook’s “friend
suggestion” algorithm.14 This algorithm is a proprietary computer
program, developed by Facebook’s coders, that generates notifications
suggesting users “friend” other selected users, based upon users’
shared interests (as identified by Facebook) and other factors.15 And as
Chief Judge Robert Katzmann of the Second Circuit argued in a partial
dissent to the Force opinion, § 230(c)(1) arguably does not immunize
Facebook from these claims, since the relevant content generated by
this algorithm was not “provided by another user” as the statute
requires, but created by Facebook itself.16
Facebook, Judge Katzmann argued, could be liable under §
230(c)(1) for suits based on the site’s algorithmically generated
content—the “friend suggestions”—if the algorithm, as the Force
plaintiffs claimed, mines user activity on the site, analyzes data points
like users’ “likes” and clicks, and then “suggests” friends and other
content a user might enjoy.17 The algorithm identifies people with
terror-related interests and suggests they become friends with existing
Hamas members, essentially sending Hamas eager new recruits.18
would not be similarly barred by § 230(c)(1) from bringing criminal material
support charges against Facebook.
13
See, e.g., Crosby v. Twitter, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 3d 564, 568 (E.D. Mich.
2018), aff'd, 921 F.3d 617, 627 (6th Cir. 2019). See also KOSSEFF, supra note
11, at 228–38 (discussing Fields v. Twitter, Inc., 217 F. Supp. 3d 1116 (N.D.
Cal. 2016), aff’d 881 F.3d 739, 750 (9th Cir. 2018). As Kosseff notes, the
district court in Fields held that the CDA barred the plaintiffs’ material support
claims. The Ninth Circuit, however, declined to reach the CDA question,
instead affirming the lower court’s dismissal for lack of proximate cause.
14
See Force, 934 F.3d at 77 (J. Katzmann, dissenting).
15
See id.
16
See id.
17
See id.
18
In the past, Facebook has closely guarded the details of its proprietary
algorithms’ actual function. See Will Oremus, Who Controls Your Facebook
Feed, SLATE (Jan. 3, 2016),
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/cover_story/2016/01/how_faceboo
k_s_news_feed_algorithm_works.html (2016 article discussing the secret
nature of Facebook’s newsfeed algorithm; the Force plaintiffs brought
claims based on incidents in 2014 and 2016.). Since the Force plaintiffs’
claims were dismissed prior to discovery, their allegations as to the friend
suggestion algorithm’s function at the time remain untested. See Force, 934
F.3d at 61–62. This article accepts the Force plaintiffs’ allegations for
purposes of discussion only.
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Facebook, the Force plaintiffs said, knows that its algorithmic
programming choices cause this result, yet has failed to adjust the
algorithm to eliminate the recruitment effect.19 This, they claimed, is
providing support to international terrorists as defined in 18 U.S.C. §§
2239A or 2239B.20 By violating the material support provisions,
Facebook becomes liable under the ATA’s civil cause of action, found
at 18 U.S.C. § 2333.21
This novel algorithmic argument leads to a novel issue: the
constitutionality of the ATA’s material support provisions as applied
to Facebook’s algorithm. Because courts have previously resolved all
civil material support claims against social media companies like
Facebook on statutory grounds under either Section 230 or § 2333, no
court has yet addressed the question of whether §§ 2339A, 2339B, and
2333 could be permissibly applied to an algorithm like this, which may
be “speech” protected by the First Amendment.22 Only if the statute’s
civil cause of action and the underlying criminal provisions, as applied
to this algorithm, are constitutional will plaintiffs like those in Force
realize an opportunity to seek relief on the merits.23
In sum, victims of international terrorism bringing civil
material support claims against social media companies like Facebook
must clear two preliminary hurdles, which this article examines. First,
there is a question of statutory immunity under § 230(c)(1) of the
Communications Decency Act.24 This is the question addressed in
Force. Second, there is a question of whether the First Amendment
prevents Congress from regulating the algorithm at issue.25
19

See Force, 934 F.3d at 77 (J. Katzmann, dissenting).
Id. at 61 (plaintiff’s claims under §2333); see infra note 21 (describing the
relationship between §2333 and §2339A and B).
21
Plaintiffs (like those in Force) bringing material support-theory claims
against U.S. companies under § 2333’s JASTA-added secondary liability
provisions must essentially step into the shoes of the government and prove
that the company is guilty of violating § 2339A or § 2339B. Once such a
violation is established, it serves as the basis for and supplies the mens rea
required by § 2333. See Maryam Jamshidi How the War on Terror Is
Transforming Private U.S. Law, 96 WASH. U.L. REV. 559, 576–91 (2018)
(listing cases proceeding on this theory and explaining the relationship
between § 2333 and § 2339A–B in detail).
22
See Crosby, 303 F. Supp. 3d at 568; see also Retana v. Twitter, Inc., 419 F.
Supp. 3d 989, 989–95 (N.D. Tex. 2019). On the threshold question of whether
Facebook’s algorithmic question is “speech” protected by the First
Amendment and, if so, how robustly, see infra Section III.
23
See infra Section II.C. (discussing Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project).
24
See Force, 934 F.3d 53 at 61; see infra Section I.C.
25
See infra Section II.
20
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Assuming for purposes of this analysis that the claims raised
in Force about the operation and effect of Facebook’s friend suggestion
algorithm are true, this article first considers statutory hurdles. It argues
that the text and purpose of § 230(c)(1) and (2) together reflect
Congress’ desire to protect companies from defamation-type suits,
encouraging them to engage in content filtering and removal. To reflect
this purpose, the Court should adopt a limited “definitional”
interpretation of § 230(c)(1), favored by the Seventh Circuit.26 This
article rejects the broad “immunity” approach favored by many circuits
as unsupported by the text of the statute, in structural and historical
context, and as granting overbroad protection. The definitional
approach to § 230(c)(1) does not bar algorithmic material support
claims like those raised by the Force plaintiffs.27 Though companies
like Facebook would no doubt prefer a total immunity interpretation,
they need not fear unfair ruinous liability under the material support
statute’s civil provisions, the Anti-Terrorism Act’s proximate cause
requirement will still bar all but the most meritorious claims. 28
Next, this article examines the constitutional hurdle. First, it
considers whether Facebook’s friend suggestion algorithm is
constitutionally protected speech. Applying the work of First
Amendment scholar Stuart Minor Benjamin, it concludes that this
algorithm is constitutionally protected speech, because (1) Facebook’s
programmers, at the direction of its CEO, direct this algorithm to find
and prioritize certain user data, which it analyzes to create new
content—the friend suggestions, and (2) the algorithm communicates
Facebook’s message that increased social interaction is desirable.29
Finally, it considers whether the material support statute is
unconstitutional as applied to civil claims based on Facebook’s
algorithms. Applying the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project to the facts alleged in Force, it concludes
that the ATA’s civil liability provision cannot constitutionally be
applied to Facebook’s algorithmic speech.30 The article concludes by
considering potential reforms to Section 230, including a proposed
terrorism carve out. This would prevent Section 230 from being used
as a defense to liability under the ATA, raising the constitutional issue
this article identifies.

26

See infra Section I.B.
See infra Section I.C.
28
See infra Section I.C.
29
See infra Section II.A.
30
See infra Section II.C.
27
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THE STATUTORY HURDLES: CDA SECTION 230, THE ATA,
AND FACEBOOK’S “FRIEND SUGGESTION” ALGORITHM

Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) of
1996 is the first hurdle plaintiffs like those in Force must clear.31 In
their petition for cert, the Force plaintiffs asked the Court to resolve a
circuit split regarding the type and scope of immunity granted to social
media platforms under § 230(c)(1).32 Under the broadest form of the
majority “immunity” approach (employed in Force by the Second
Circuit), any civil claim against Facebook that is even indirectly based
on user content is barred.33 This includes the Force plaintiffs’
algorithm-based claims. Alternatively, if the Court adopts the minority
“definitional” approach to § 230(c)(1), which holds that this subsection
merely blocks treating an internet content provider as a “speaker or
publisher,” their claims would not be barred.34 This approach is taken
by the Seventh Circuit.35 This part of the article will examine this
circuit split in detail after taking a closer look at the statutory language
itself and the legislative history. It recommends the definitional
approach preferred by the Seventh Circuit as the better view but also
examines whether, under the Second Circuit’s immunity approach, the
Force plaintiffs’ claims are necessarily barred.
31

See Force, 934 F.3d at 61.
Cf. the “immunity approach” circuits: See Force, 934 F.3d at 53; Jane Doe
No. 1 v. Backpage.com, 817 F.3d 12, 18–20 (1st Cir. 2016); Green v. Am.
Online (AOL), 318 F.3d 465, 470 (3d Cir. 2003); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc.,
129 F.3d 327, 330–31 (4th Cir. 1997); Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413,
418 (5th Cir. 2008); Jones v. Dirty World Ent. Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398,
406–10 (6th Cir. 2014); Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 792 (8th Cir. 2010);
Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521
F.3d 1157, 1176–88 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc); Silver v. Quora, Inc., 666 Fed.
App’x 727, 728–29 (10th Cir. 2016); Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d
1316, 1324 (11th Cir. 2006) (with the “definitional approach” articulated in
Chicago Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc.,
461 F. Supp. 2d 681, 693–98 (N.D. Ill. 2006), aff’d sub nom. Chicago
Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d
666, 669–72 (7th Cir. 2008). The Ninth Circuit, however, is moving closer to
the definitional approach. See Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1100–
01 (9th Cir. 2009)).
33
See infra Section II.A.; see also Force, 934 F.3d at 64. A petition for panel
rehearing or, alternatively, rehearing en banc was denied. Order, Force, No.
18-397, 2019 at 2–3 (2d Cir. 2019). As noted previously, § 230 does not
immunize Facebook from criminal liability under §§ 2339A–B. See 47 U.S.C.
230(e)(1).
34
Force, 934 F.3d at 62.
35
See Chicago Lawyers, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 693–98.
32
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A. The CDA and the ATA: two statutes with diverging
purposes
Considering the legislative history and purpose of the ATA and
the CDA helps us understand whether, how, and why the CDA might
exempt Facebook from civil liability under the ATA. The legislative
history of the ATA reflects Congress’ effort to expand ways to hold
terrorists and their supporters liable.36 The legislative history of the
CDA reflects Congress’ desire to protect two distinct constituencies:
internet users and internet companies.37 The claim at issue in Force
thus presents an interpretive dilemma. Expansive interpretation of the
ATA raises liability for internet companies whom the CDA seeks to
protect, while expansive interpretation of the CDA deprives
sympathetic terror victims of a potentially powerful cause of action.
The ATA, found at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331-2339, provides civil and
criminal causes of action against foreign terrorists. Section 2333, the
civil cause of action for victims of terrorist acts, dates to 1992.38
Section 2239A, which criminalizes providing material support in aid
of terrorist attacks, was added in 1994.39 Section 2239B, which
similarly criminalizes providing material support to a designated
foreign terrorist organization, was added in 1996.40 By the same
legislation in 1996, Congress also amended and enlarged Section
2339A.41 In 2016, Congress amended and broadened § 2333 through
the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA).42 JASTA, the
purpose of which was to “provide civil litigants with the broadest
possible basis . . . to seek relief against [material supporters of
terrorism],” added secondary liability for civil aiding and abetting, and
for civil conspiracy, to § 2333.43
Most recently, Congress amended §§ 2331 and 2333 in 2018’s
Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act (ATCA), limiting exclusions from
liability under the ATCA and expanding the ATCA’s civil remedies
36

See infra notes 39–48 and accompanying text (describing Congressional
actions expanding the ATA’s causes of action).
37
See infra notes 60–62 and accompanying text.
38
See Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, §
1003, 106 Stat. 4506, 4522.
39
See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-322, § 120005, 108 Stat. 2022.
40
See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), Pub. L. No.
104-132, § 303, 110 Stat. 1214, 1250 (1996).
41
See id. § 323.
42
See Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA), Pub. L. 114-222,
§ 2(b), 130 Stat. 852, 853 (2016).
43
Id.
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and jurisdiction.44 ATCA, like JASTA, was intended to help plaintiffs
recover for injuries suffered at the hands of terrorists.45 ATCA’s
amendments applied not just prospectively but to “any civil action
pending on . . . the date of the enactment of this Act.”46 This unusual
provision was the result of “active advocacy effort by plaintiffs who
had received adverse decisions in existing terrorism-related civil
litigation” and was “primarily intended to revive those plaintiffs’
cases.”47 Thus, the recent history of the ATA reflects Congress’ desire
to increase terror victims’ access to civil remedies. However, this intent
to expand the statute’s reach does not explicitly overrule the CDA. 48
Notably, the pending terrorism-based civil claims Congress revived by
ATCA did not include terrorism-based civil material support cases
against social media companies, though several such claims had been
filed and dismissed under the CDA by that time, as Congress was
surely aware.49
The CDA, now found at 47 U.S.C § 230, was enacted in 1996
as the internet first began to touch many Americans’ lives.50 As
enacted, the CDA was comprised of two sections: § 223 and § 230.51
Section 223, which courts swiftly deemed an unconstitutional
restriction on users’ First Amendment-protected rights, created
protections to shield minor users from obscene or harassing content and

44

See Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act (ATCA), Pub. L. 115-253, § 2(a), 132
Stat. 3183 (2018).
45
See H.R. REP. NO. 115-858, at 2 (2018).
46
ATCA, Pub. L. 115-253, §§ 2(b), 3(b), 132 Stat. 3183 (2018).
47
See Harry Graver & Scott R. Anderson, Shedding Light on the AntiTerrorism Clarification Act of 2018, LAWFARE (Oct. 25, 2018, 12:00 PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/shedding-light-anti-terrorism-clarification-act2018.
48
The Second Circuit rejected the Force plaintiffs’ claim that the 2016 JASTA
amendments to § 2339A and § 2339B implicitly repealed § 230(c)(1). Force,
934 F.3d at 72 (“JASTA merely expanded Section 2333's cause of action to
secondary liability; it provides no obstacle—explicit or implicit—to applying
Section 230.”).
49
See Graver & Anderson, supra note 47; see also Crosby v. Twitter, Inc., 303
F. Supp. 3d 564, 568 (E.D. Mich. 2018), aff'd, 921 F.3d 617, 622 (6th Cir.
2019); Pennie v. Twitter, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 3d 874, 887 (N.D. Cal. 2017);
Fields v. Twitter, Inc., 217 F. Supp. 3d 1116, 1120 (N.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d,
881 F.3d 739, 749–50 (9th Cir. 2018) (affirming dismissal on proximate
causation without reaching the CDA issue).
50
See generally KOSSEFF, supra note 11.
51
See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 §
501-09.
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penalize internet providers for knowingly transmitting it.52 According
to its author, Senator James Exon, § 223’s purpose was to make sure
the “information superhighway” did not become a “red light district”
where children would be accosted with “inappropriate
communications” or citizens menaced by “uninvited indecencies.”53
Section 230 was introduced as the “Online Family
Empowerment” amendment to Senator Exon’s legislation, by
Representatives Chris Cox and Ron Wyden, who feared Exon’s CDA
would stifle online freedom and technological innovation.54 It was a
direct response to a court decision that had shaken the nascent internet
industry, Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Company.55 In
Stratton Oakmont, the internet company Prodigy was held liable as a
“publisher” of defamatory statements posted by a user on its chat
board.56 Ironically, Prodigy’s efforts to screen and remove such
offensive content had exposed it to this liability.57 As a factually similar
case had recently found, an internet service provider could not be held
liable as a publisher when it took no steps to police content on its chat
boards.58 Stratton Oakmont provided a strong disincentive for
companies to establish and enforce content standards.59

52
See id. § 502; see also Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 117 S.Ct.
2329, 2329-30, 2340 (1997) (affirming lower court order enjoining the
Government from enforcing the criminal provisions of § 223(a) and (d)).
53
141 Cong. Rec. S1953 (July 16, 1996); Robert Cannon, The Legislative
History of Senator Exon's Communications Decency Act: Regulating
Barbarians on the Information Superhighway, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. at *53
(1996).
54
See 141 Cong. Rec. H8468-69 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995). See also KOSSEFF,
supra note 11, at 59–76.
55
See 141 Cong. Rec. H8468-69 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (Cox stated,
“Ironically, the existing legal system provides a massive disincentive for the
people who might best help us control the Internet to do so,” and comparing
Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL
323710, at *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995), with Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe,
Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)); see also H.R. REP. No. 104458, at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (“One of the specific purposes of this section
is to overrule Stratton-Oakmont v. Prodigy and any other similar decisions
which have treated such providers and users as publishers or speakers of
content that is not their own because they have restricted access to
objectionable material.”); see also KOSSEFF, supra note 11, at 45–56.
56
See supra note 55.
57
See supra note 55.
58
See Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 140.
59
See supra note 55.
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Beyond overruling Stratton Oakmont, Cox and Wyden’s
amendment had two purposes.60 It aimed to “promote the continued
development of the internet” by safeguarding the industry from
burdensome state and federal regulation.61 It also aimed to maximize
users’ control over what information they—and their children—
received via the internet.62 These purposes supported each other. Only
if companies were free to innovate and satisfy diverse user preferences
for “safe” (or unsafe) content would the internet continue to flourish,
and only if companies were willing to provide such screening could
users be effectively protected.63 To this end, § 230(c), the operable
portion of § 230, is titled “Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking
and screening of offensive material” and is comprised of two
subsections.64 The first, § 230(c)(1), “Treatment of publisher or
speaker,” states in full that: “No provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
information provided by another information content provider.”65 The
second, § 230(c)(2), “Civil liability,” provides that “[n]o provider or
user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account
of” their voluntary good faith actions “to restrict access to or
availability of” material the provider considers “objectionable,”66 or
their voluntary provision or enabling of content blocking or screening
technologies.67 Section 230 specifically excludes certain laws from its
scope, notably intellectual property laws, criminal laws, and the

60

See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b).
Id.
62
Id.
63
See 141 Cong. Rec. H8468-69 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (Remarks of Rep.
Cox: “Some have suggested . . . that we hire even more bureaucrats and more
regulators who will attempt, either civilly or criminally, to punish people by
catching them in the act of putting something into cyberspace. Frankly, there
is just too much going on on the Internet for that to be effective. No matter
how big the army of bureaucrats, it is not going to protect my kids because I
do not think the Federal Government will get there in time . . . [we need]
something that actually works.”).
64
47 U.S.C. § 230(c).
65
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
66
This includes material that is “obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively
violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is
constitutionally protected.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2).
67
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2).
61
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provisions of (invalidated) § 223.68 The ATA’s civil cause of action is
not among these exclusions.69
Section 230(c)(1) is the provision at issue in Force. It confers
protection from civil suits when three criteria are met.70 First, the
defendant must be a provider of an interactive computer service.71
Second, the claims must be based upon information provided by
another information content provider.72 And third, the service provider
must be being treated as the publisher or speaker of the information at
issue.73 Courts are split, however, on the scope and type of protection
that § 230(c)(1) provides.74 Some courts hold it confers broad immunity
and use an expansive concept of “publication,” while others hold it
confers only limited immunity or functions as a “definitional” carve
out for publication-based torts like defamation.75 This section
recommends the Court resolve this circuit split by adopting the Seventh
Circuit’s definitional approach to § 230(c)(1), as this limited approach
provides appropriate protection for internet companies and respects the
bounds of the CDA, as written. It then considers whether, under this or
the majority immunity interpretation, § 230(c)(1) properly bars claims
like those at issue in Force.
B. Resolving the current circuit split about what protection §
230(c)(1) grants to internet communication service
providers like Facebook
Courts consistently find that Facebook is a provider of an
interactive computer service potentially covered by § 230(c)(1).76 But
courts are split on the scope and type of protection § 230(c)(1) grants

68

47 U.S.C. § 230(e).
See id. The Second Circuit rejected the Force plaintiffs’ claims that because
§ 230 does not apply to criminal provisions, and § 2333 depends upon proving
the underlying criminal violations in §§ 2339A or B, the CDA did not apply
to their claims under § 2333. Force, 934 F.3d at 71.
70
See, e.g., Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment Recordings, LLC, 755 F.3d
398, 409 (3rd Cir. 2014).
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Cf. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330–31 (4th Cir. 1997), with
Chicago Lawyers’ Committee for Rights Under Civil Law, Inc. v. Craigslist,
519 F.3d 666, 669 (7th Cir. 2008).
75
See supra note 74.
76
See, e.g., Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1355–60 (D.C. Cir. 2014);
see also Sikhs for Justice, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., 144 F. Supp. 3d 1088, 1093
(N.D. Cal. 2015), aff'd, 697 F. App'x 526 (9th Cir. 2017).
69
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to service providers like Facebook.77 A majority of courts hold that §
230(c)(1) gives internet providers immunity from any claim based on
the activity of “publishing” third-party content.78 Some courts consider
this immunity broad, covering any civil claim based on the service’s
making information provided by a user available to others.79 Other
courts limit this immunity to claims based on a service’s “exercise of
traditional editorial functions.”80 Still others find that § 230(c)(1)
defines limits on application of “publisher” liability.81
The immunity approach was established in Zeran v. America
Online (AOL).82 Zeran involved malicious anonymous posts made to
AOL’s online “bulletin board.”83 The posts, made just a week after the
1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma
City, advertised the sale of t-shirts bearing horribly “offensive and
tasteless slogans” related to the attack.84 Users were urged to call Ken
Zeran to purchase these shirts.85 After the unsuspecting and innocent
Zeran was deluged with irate calls and threats, he reported the hoax
posts to AOL.86 Zeran repeatedly requested that AOL remove the posts,
block the anonymous poster, and post a retraction. When his pleas went
unanswered, he sued AOL for negligence and defamation.87 AOL
raised § 230 as a defense and moved for judgment on the pleadings,
which the trial court granted.88
The Fourth Circuit’s opinion affirming the lower court’s
decision made several bold assertions about § 230. First, the court
stated, the “plain language” of § 230(c)(1) where “‘[n]o provider or
77

See supra note 74.
See Backpage.com, 817 F.3d at 12; see Force, 934 F.3d at 53; see Green v.
America Online (AOL), 318 F.3d at 465; see Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330–31; see
MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d at 413; see Jones, 735 F.3d at 406–07; see Johnson,
614 F.3d at 785; see Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d at 1157; see Silver, 666
Fed. App’x at 727; see Almeida, 456 F.3d at 1316; Marshall’s Locksmith
Serv. Inc., v. Google, LLC, 925 F.3d 1263, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
79
See Force, 934 F.3d at 64; see MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d at 418; see Jones,
755 F.3d at 406–07.
80
See Backpage.com, 817 F.3d at 18; see Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1101 (finding §
230 applied to a non-publication-based tort where the cause was essentially
defamation, recast, and applying a “publication”-type analysis).
81
See City of Chicago v. StubHub!, Inc., 624 F.3d 363, 366 (7th Cir. 2010).
82
See Zeran,129 F.3d at 330.
83
See id.
84
See id.
85
See id.
86
At one point, “Zeran was receiving an abusive phone call approximately
every two minutes.” Id. at 329.
87
Id. at 328.
88
See Zeran,129 F.3d at 329–30.
78
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user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher
or speaker of any information provided by another information content
provider . . . creates a federal immunity to any cause of action that
would make service providers liable for information originating with a
third-party user of the service.”89 Specifically, it stated, this bars
“lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a
publisher's traditional editorial functions—such as deciding whether to
publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content.”90 Next, though it had
declared the language “plain,” the court considered the legislative
intent behind § 230.91 Focusing on § 230’s internet service providerprotective purpose (while barely mentioning its customer-protective
purpose) the court announced that § 230(c) should be interpreted
“broadly,” in favor of immunity for companies.92 Applying this broad
construction, the court held that AOL was immunized against the
negligence and defamation claims.93
Zeran’s dicta supports the broadest version of § 230(c)(1)
immunity.94 In dicta, the court stated that the Congressional antiregulatory intent behind § 230(c) supported reading that provision as
extending companies immunity to “tort.” 95 Congress, the Zeran court
said, “recognized the threat that tort-based lawsuits pose to freedom of
speech in the new and burgeoning Internet medium.”96 In enacting §
230(c), Congress chose to deter harmful online content through
“vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and punish
trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of
computer,” and not “through the separate route of imposing tort
liability on companies that serve as intermediaries for other parties'
potentially injurious messages.”97 Courts following a narrow immunity

89

Id. at 330.
Id.
91
But see Caminetti v. United States, 37 S. Ct. 192, 194 (1917) (“Where the
language is plain and admits of no more than one meaning, the duty of
interpretation does not arise” and courts should look only to the text.).
92
Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330.
93
Id. at 335.
94
See Force, 934 F.3d at 53; see MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d at 418; see Jones,
755 F.3d at 406–07; see Almeida, 456 F.3d at 1321; see Marshall’s Locksmith
Serv., 925 F.3d at 1267.
95
See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330–31.
96
Id. at 330 (emphasis added).
97
Id. at 330–31 (citing § 230(b)(5)) (emphasis added).
90
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approach, by contrast, look to Zeran’s more limited “traditional
editorial functions” language.98
On the other side of the split is the Seventh Circuit, which
considers § 230(c)(1) a “definitional provision” that provides no
immunity.99 Instead, the section “limits who may be called the
publisher of information that appears online” and is a defense to
liability under actions that depend upon status as a “publisher.” 100 A
Chicago district court, declining to follow the by then well-established
Zeran approach, articulated this approach in Chicago Lawyers'
Committee For Civil Rights Under the Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc.101
Chicago Lawyers involved a Fair Housing Act (FHA) challenge
brought by a nonprofit group against Craigslist, an online classified ads
site.102 The group sought a declaratory judgment that Craigslist, by
accepting and displaying housing ads that expressed an impermissible
preference for certain tenants, violated provisions of the FHA.103 The
ads were posted by users through Craigslist’s submission portal.104
Craigslist claimed § 230(c)(1) immunized it from FHA liability, since
the discriminatory ad content was provided by users.105 “[T]en
companies and trade associations affiliated with the online and
electronic communications industries,” including Amazon, Google,
and Yahoo!, filed a joint amicus brief urging the court to adopt
Craigslist’s position.106
The district court acknowledged that “[n]ear-unanimous case
law [following Zeran] holds that Section 230(c) affords immunity to
[internet companies] against suits that seek to hold [them] liable for
third-party content.”107 However, the court respectfully disagreed with
Zeran’s broad reading of § 230.108 “It is a fundamental canon of
statutory construction,” the district court noted, “that the words of a
98
See id. at 330; see also Backpage.com, 817 F.3d at 12 (1st Cir. 2016);
Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1101, as amended (Sept. 28, 2009) (finding § 230 applied
to a non-publication-based tort where the cause was essentially defamation,
recast, and applying a “publication”-type analysis).
99
See StubHub!, Inc., 624 F.3d at 366.
100
See id.
101
Chicago Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist,
Inc., 461 F. Supp. 2d 681, 693 (N.D. Ill. 2006), aff’d sub nom. 519 F.3d 666
(7th Cir. 2008).
102
Chicago Lawyers, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 686.
103
Id. at 685–87.
104
Id. at 684–85.
105
Id. at 687.
106
Id. at 683–84.
107
Id. at 688.
108
Chicago Lawyers, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 693.
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statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in
the overall statutory scheme.”109 Bearing this in mind, “Section
230(c)(1) does not bar ‘any cause of action,’ as Zeran holds and as
Craigslist contends, but instead is more limited—it bars those causes
of action that would require treating an [internet company] as a
publisher of third-party content,” as its title and caption indicated.110
“First and foremost,” the court explained, “Zeran overstates the ‘plain
language’ of Section 230(c)(1).”111 The subsection’s text never
mentioned “immunity.”112 And the Zeran court had itself indicated,
before phrasing its holding in sweeping language, that the provision
was limited to torts based on a provider’s publisher-like exercise of
traditional editorial functions.113 Subsequent courts granting broad
immunity reasoned based on Zeran’s interpretation, not § 230(c)(1)’s
text, it noted.114 Moreover, the broad immunity approach gave
companies no incentive to filter content, because they would be
protected whether they did or didn’t police content and filtering would
cost more than not filtering.115 So doing, the Zeran interpretation
undercut the CDA’s second purpose—protecting users.116
Rejecting Zeran’s approach, the district court held that Section
230(c)(1) “does not grant immunity per se [but] does prohibit treatment
as a publisher, which, quite plainly, would bar any cause of action that
requires, to establish liability, a finding that [the company] published
third-party content.”117 Because the FHA provision at issue made it
illegal “[t]o make, print, or publish . . . any [discriminatory] notice,
statement, or advertisement,” § 230(c)(1) did in fact apply and
Craigslist could not be held liable as a publisher of the discriminatory

109

Id. at 693.
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id. at 688–89 (quoting Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330) (“Specifically, § 230
precludes . . . lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise
of a publisher's traditional editorial functions—such as deciding whether to
publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content.”).
114
Chicago Lawyers, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 688–89; but see Barnes, 570 F.3d at
1100 (noting that the Ninth Circuit’s decisions in Roommates, 521 F.3d at
1171 (9th Cir. 2008), and Barnes rested not on “broad statements of
immunity” but on “careful exegesis”).
115
Chicago Lawyers, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 691.
116
See id.
117
Id. at 696.
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housing ads.118 The Seventh Circuit affirmed this result and the court’s
definitional approach.119
Notwithstanding most circuits’ adoption of the immunity
approach, the Court should resolve this circuit split by adopting the
Seventh Circuit’s definitional interpretation of § 230(c)(1), which is the
more faithful reading of this provision.120 As the persistent existence of
this circuit split shows, the language of § 230(c)(1) is not plain but
ambiguous.121 Therefore, the Court should consider the text in
context.122 While powerful online communication companies no doubt
prefer the majority approach (and could lobby for a statute that grants
such broad immunity), the Seventh Circuit’s definitional approach is
the better reading for three reasons. First, the text of § 230(c)(1) does
not grant “immunity”—either broad or narrow.123 Second, the
definitional approach functionally aligns § 230(c)(1) with § 230(c)(2)
and accords with § 230(c)(1)’s title and caption.124 And third, the
definitional approach more closely tracks Congress’ two stated
purposes for § 230.125
First, as the Seventh Circuit noted in Chicago Lawyers, the
majority’s immunity approach grows out of an erroneous and
overbroad reading of § 230 established in Zeran.126 Zeran claimed that
§ 230, “[b]y its plain language . . . creates a federal immunity to any
cause of action that would make service providers liable for
information originating with a third-party user of the service.”127 But
as the Seventh Circuit points out, § 230(c)(1) does not use the word
“immunity” or words like “shall not be held liable for” that are
118

Id. at 696–98.
Id. at 667.
120
The Ninth Circuit, while still using an immunity approach, narrowed its
approach after Roommates.com and has adopted some of the language of the
Seventh Circuit’s definitional approach. See Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1100.
121
See Graham City Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States. ex rel.
Wilson, 125 S. Ct. 2444, 2451 n.2 (2005) (declaring a statute ambiguous
“because its text, literally read, admits of two plausible interpretations”).
122
See Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 539–40 (2015).
123
See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1); see also Chicago Lawyers, 461 F. Supp. 2d at
693 (§ 230(c)(1) “does not mention ‘immunity’ or any similar term or phrase
. . . [unlike § 230(c)(2)] which uses language that unequivocally creates
immunity: ‘no provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held
liable on account of . . .’”).
124
See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2); City of Chicago, Ill. v. StubHub!, Inc., 624 F.3d
363, 365 (7th Cir. 2010).
125
See supra notes 60–62 and accompanying text.
126
Chicago Lawyers, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 693.
127
Zeran, F.3d at 330.
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commonly understood to grant immunity.128 Section 230(c)(2), by
contrast, does use traditional immunity-granting words, reading “no
[provider]. . . shall be held liable on account of.”129 As the Court has
noted, “where Congress includes particular language in one section of
a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally
presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the
disparate inclusion or exclusion.”130 So, if Congress intended §
230(c)(1) to grant broad immunity in the manner of (c)(2), it likely
would have used the same or similar words in each subsection.
Second, as the Seventh Circuit emphasized in another case,
City of Chicago v. StubHub!, the definitional approach, unlike the
broad immunity approach, properly considers the provision’s full,
contextualized purpose, as shown by its title and caption.131 The
Supreme Court understands that, “[a]lthough section headings cannot
limit the plain meaning of a statutory text, they supply cues as to what
Congress intended.”132 Section 230 is titled “Protection for private
blocking and screening of offensive material.”133 Subsection (c) is
captioned “Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and screening of
offensive material.”134 Because both headings reference “offensive
material,” this strongly suggests they were intended to limit
defamation-type, content-based claims, not all tort claims as the broad
immunity approach holds. 135
StubHub! drives home the vast over-applicability of the broad
immunity approach. In StubHub!, an online ticket marketplace,
StubHub!, claimed that § 230(c)(1) exempted it from having to collect
and remit an amusement tax imposed by Chicago.136 StubHub! claimed
that under § 230’s broad immunity it was exempted from collecting
taxes on the ticket transactions it facilitated.137 Rejecting this
interpretation, Judge Easterbrook noted that “Section 230's title,
‘Protection for private blocking and screening of offensive material’,
does not suggest that it limits taxes that have nothing to do with
128

See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1); see Chicago Lawyers, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 693.
See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2); see Chicago Lawyers, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 693.
130
Russello v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 296, 300 (1983).
131
StubHub!, Inc., 624 F.3d at 365.
132
Merit Mgmt. Grp., LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 883, 893 (2018);
cf. Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 539 (2015).
133
47 U.S.C. § 230.
134
47 U.S.C. § 230(c).
135
As the legislative history of the CDA shows, the “offensive material”
Congress was concerned with was online pornography, defamation,
harassment, and disparagement. See supra notes 58–64, 66.
136
StubHub!, 624 F.3d at 365.
137
See id.
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[offensive content].”138 Nor, he said, did “Subsection (c)'s caption,
‘Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and screening of offensive
material[.]’”139 Both the title and caption instead suggested Congress
intended § 230(c)(1) to apply to publication-based claims like the
disparagement and defamation claims at issue in Stratton Oakmont and
Cubby.140 Zeran’s approach, he emphasized, potentially reaching even
tax claims, far exceeded Congressional intent for § 230.141 And, as the
district court had noted in Chicago Lawyers, the Zeran approach
undermined the user protections Congress had intended to encourage,
by eliminating financial incentive for companies to police their own
content.142
The narrow immunity approach addresses this latter concern
by limiting immunity to cases involving the company’s engagement in
traditional
publisher-type
activities
like
editing
and
promoting/removing material. But only the definitional approach hews
to the text of § 230(c)(1) by not granting “immunity” Congress did not
authorize. For this reason, even though the majority of circuits
currently do otherwise, the Court should adopt a definitional approach
to § 230(c)(1) and reject both the broad and narrow immunity
approaches.
C. Reconsidering whether § 230(c)(1) bars the Force
plaintiffs’ algorithmic material support claims
Of course, the Force plaintiffs did not seek cert merely to
resolve this circuit split. They hoped for a finding that § 230(c)(1) does
not bar material support claims based on Facebook’s friend suggestion
algorithm.
Under the Seventh Circuit’s definitional approach, these
claims are not barred.143 The Force plaintiffs asserted claims based on
three provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA): 18 U.S.C. §

138

Id.
Id.
140
See id. at 365–66; see 141 CONG. REC. H8469-70 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995)
(Remarks of Rep. Cox, comparing Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs.
Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710, at *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) with
Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)).
141
Cf. StubHub!, 624 F.3d at 366, with Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129
F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir. 1997).
142
Chicago Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist,
Inc., 461 F. Supp. 2d 681, 693 (N.D. Ill. 2006), aff’d sub nom. 519 F.3d 666
(7th Cir. 2008).
143
See StubHub!, 624 F.3d at 366.
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2333(a), § 2339A, and § 2339B.144 Unlike a defamation claim or the
FHA claims at issue in Chicago Lawyers, liability under these
provisions does not depend on whether Facebook is a publisher.145
Rather, “any person” (natural or corporate) who knowingly provides
“material support or resources” to a prohibited person or organization
is potentially liable.146
The Force plaintiffs might also prevail if the Court adopts an
immunity approach, under possible reasonings offered by Chief Judge
Katzmann in his Force dissent.147 As the dissent notes, Facebook’s
friend suggestion algorithm is arguably not “content provided by
another internet content provider.”148 If that is so, the algorithm-based
claims are not exempted under either the broad or narrow immunity
approach. Alternatively, Facebook’s friend suggestion algorithm may
not perform a traditional “publishing” function, so under the narrow
immunity approach the claims are not barred.149
As Judge Katzmann first suggests, Facebook’s friend
suggestions are not “information provided by another information
content provider” and are thus completely outside § 230(c)’s scope.150
The algorithms allegedly create new informational content from raw
data about user activities.151 The Force majority rejected this view,
using a “material contribution” test developed for defamation cases.152
Under that test, because Facebook did not “directly and materially
contribute to what made the content itself unlawful,” Facebook did not
“develop” the content. It merely chose where to “present” Hamas’
content.153 Like a traditional editor making decisions about what to
feature on the front page and what to bury inside, Facebook’s friend
algorithm merely identified some profiles to place more prominently
than the rest.154
144
See Force, 934 F.3d at 61 n.10. Plaintiffs bringing civil claims under § 2333
on a secondary liability material support theory must first step into the shoes
of a prosecutor and show a violation of § 2339A or § 2339B, which violation
serves as the basis of civil liability. See supra, note 21.
145
See Chicago Lawyers, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 693.
146
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A, 2339B (both providing that “whoever” provides
material support as defined by the statute shall be punished under the statute).
147
See Force, 934 F.3d at 77 (Katzman, C.J. concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
148
See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1); see Force, 934 F.3d at 77.
149
Force, 934 F.3d at 77.
150
See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
151
See Force, 934 F.3d at 77.
152
See id. at 68–70.
153
See id. at 68–69.
154
See id. at 66–67.
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But as the dissent rightly points out, if Facebook’s algorithm
operates as the plaintiffs claim, it does not just present friend
suggestions but creates these suggestions.155 Put another way,
Facebook’s algorithm is not like Buzzfeed or another site that skims
your blog posts and arranges completed content you posted elsewhere.
It is like a researcher who pokes through your trashcan to uncover
secret habits and patterns about your life—patterns you have not
knowingly revealed and may not have yourself recognized—analyzes
the resulting data, and sells your name in a database to purveyors of
items your trash reveals you might want to purchase. Your trash isn’t
the product this garbage-picking researcher is selling. And the database
he has produced is not an altered or edited version of your trash. Its
value lies in the synthesized product—new information which the
researcher, not you, created. As this analogy shows, the Force dissent’s
interpretation is correct. Facebook’s algorithms are content created by
Facebook, not another user.156 Section 230 should be “irrelevant” to
these claims.157
As Judge Katzmann alternatively suggests, Facebook’s friend
suggestion algorithm is outside the traditional understanding of what it
means to “publish” another’s content.158 Section 230, he explains,
“does not apply whenever a claim would treat the defendant as ‘a
publisher’ in the abstract, immunizing defendants from liability
stemming from any activity in which one thinks publishing companies
commonly engage.”159 It applies when the service acts as “the
publisher” of the specific content at issue by engaging in editorial
functions like “deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone, or
alter content” submitted by another.160 That is not the case with
Facebook’s algorithm. To illustrate, imagine you are a published book
author. Amazon, having tracked a customer’s past purchases,
determines that customer would enjoy your latest book. It suggests the
customer buy your book. Amazon, of course, is not the publisher or
editor of your book. It’s making a sales connection. Following this
logic, Facebook is not immune for suits based on an algorithm that
performs not editorial but sales type functions.161

155

See id. at 77 (Katzmann, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See id. at 82 (J. Katzmann, dissenting in part).
157
See City of Chicago, Ill. v. StubHub!, Inc., 624 F.3d 363, 366 (7th Cir.
2010).
158
See Force, 934 F.3d at 81 (J. Katzmann, dissenting in part).
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See id. at 80–81.
160
Id. at 81.
161
See id. at 82.
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D. The ATA’s proximate causation requirement is the
appropriate statutory hurdle by which to screen
algorithmic material support claims
Section 230 is not the only statutory hurdle lying between
plaintiffs and recovery. The ATA itself presents a formidable hurdle
for plaintiffs attempting to bring algorithmic material support claims
against social media companies like Facebook.162
The ATA’s private right of action is available to a United
States national who has been injured “by reason of an act of
international terrorism.”163 “By reason of” equates to proximate
cause.164 Courts that have considered the ATA’s proximate causation
requirement in material support claims have required “some direct
relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct
alleged.”165 While the directness of the relationship is only one aspect
of a proximate cause analysis, it is a key requirement.166 A “tenuous”
connection between the social media company’s algorithmic conduct
and the terrorist act does not suffice.167
Though no court has yet considered this issue, it will be very
difficult for plaintiffs bringing algorithmic social media material
support claims to meet this proximate cause standard.168 To survive
dismissal for failure to state a claim under the ATA, a plaintiff would
likely have to show that the algorithm-generated friend suggestion
directly caused the terrorist actor to connect with a listed terrorist group
and that the resulting online interaction proximately led to the specific
action that injured the plaintiff.169 Most algorithmic material support
cases would be unable to meet this standard, given the huge number of
possible influences on any given terrorist actor and the minor weight
of a single friend suggestion. Social media companies therefore need
not fear wide exposure to expensive and intrusive discovery
proceedings for material support claims not barred by Section 230.
It is fair to social media companies that an algorithmic material
support claim should have to clear the ATA’s significant proximate
causation hurdle. But fairness also requires that victims of terror attacks
162
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Supp. 3d at 995.
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See Crosby, 921 F.3d at 624.
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pleading plausible material support claims against social media
companies should not find those claims barred by the CDA. The ATA,
not Section 230, is the appropriate statutory hurdle by which to screen
out tenuous algorithmic material support claims.
In conclusion, if the Court in future resolves the current circuit
split by adopting the Seventh Circuit’s definitional approach,
algorithmic material support claims like those brought by the Force
plaintiffs would not be barred by § 230(c)(1). Or, the Court could adopt
an immunity approach and accept one of Judge Katzmann’s arguments
that the friend suggestion algorithm-based claims are not barred. Or
finally, Congress could amend Section 230 to create a “carve-out” for
terrorism claims, as has recently been proposed.170 Should any of these
happen in a case where the plaintiffs can show proximate cause, lower
courts must next determine whether the material support statute’s civil
liability provision, as applied to Facebook’s friend suggestion
algorithm, is constitutional. Assuming for argument’s sake algorithmic
material support claims might someday pass the statutory hurdles
posed by the CDA and the ATA, this article next analyzes the
constitutional hurdle posed by the First Amendment.
II.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL HURDLE: POTENTIAL FIRST
AMENDMENT LIMITS ON MATERIAL SUPPORT LIABILITY
BASED ON FACEBOOK’S FRIEND SUGGESTION ALGORITHM

If the Supreme Court holds or Congress declares that Section
230 does not bar claims based on Facebook’s algorithmic friend
suggestions, plaintiffs like those in Force will next face a constitutional
hurdle. Facebook will argue that its algorithm is constitutionally
protected speech that the government seeks to impermissibly regulate.
It will challenge the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A, 2339B,
and 2333 as applied to this algorithm. This section considers these
hypothetical arguments and finds them convincing.
The First Amendment provides in relevant part that “Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”171 The
“freedom of speech” thus guaranteed by the Constitution is
expansive.172 It embraces discussion of “all issues about which
information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society
to cope with the exigencies of their period.”173 In order to adequately
protect valuable speech (and avoid the danger of allowing government
to decide speech’s value) the Court has held that the First Amendment
170

See infra Section II.
U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 3.
172
See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 492 (1957).
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protects such diverse “speech” as advertising, flag burning, video
games, and data mining.174
But the freedom of speech, while fundamental, is not
absolute.175 Most speech is protected from abridgment, but “[t]here are
certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise
any Constitutional problem.”176 These include incitement, true threats,
obscenity, and “fighting words.”177 And even speech protected under
the First Amendment may be regulated, under limited circumstances.178
Different kinds of speech restrictions trigger differing levels of
scrutiny: content-based regulations and regulations of political speech
receive strict scrutiny, while commercial speech regulations, for
example, receive less rigorous scrutiny.179
Thus, a court considering whether claims like the ones in Force
clear the constitutional hurdle must resolve three questions. First, is
Facebook’s friend suggestion algorithm “speech”? Second, assuming
Facebook’s algorithm is indeed speech, what level of protection, if any,
does the First Amendment provide it? And third, do §§ 2339A, 2339B,
and 2333 permissibly regulate this “algorithmic speech”? This section
addresses each of these questions, in turn.
A. Is Facebook’s friend suggestion algorithm “speech”?
Both “the creation and dissemination of information are speech
within the meaning of the First Amendment.”180 But applying this
definition to information that is created and disseminated by machines
rather than humans, at least in part, raises tricky questions about speech
limits. As one scholar has noted, giving “[t]oo little protection [to
machine-generated or machine-facilitated speech] would disserve
speakers who have evolved beyond the printed pamphlet . . . [while]
[t]oo much protection would threaten to constitutionalize many areas
174

See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc., v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (liquor
price advertising); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 417 (1989) (flag burning);
Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011) (graphically violent
video games); Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011) (data mining).
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See Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942).
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Id.; Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (incitement); Watts v.
United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (true threats).
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Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 19–20 (1971).
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See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 28 (2010).
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See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010)
(strict scrutiny); Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 475
(1989) (lesser scrutiny for commercial speech).
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of commerce and private concern without promoting the values of the
First Amendment.”181
First Amendment scholar Stuart Minor Benjamin argues that
algorithmic selection and promotion of specific content tailored to
specific users is speech under Supreme Court precedent.182 Benjamin
identifies “two—and only two—elements for First Amendment
coverage” of digital speech.183 First, that the communications
platform’s “programmers or operators either create programming or
choose what to air.”184 And second, “that in doing so they seek to
communicate messages on a variety of topics.”185 The Supreme Court
broadly interprets the “message” requirement and has stated that “a
narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition of
constitutional protection.”186
While the precise nature of Facebook’s algorithms is a closely
guarded trade secret, public information shows some of the company’s
algorithms likely satisfy both elements of Benjamin’s algorithmic
speech test.187 For example, in early 2018, Facebook CEO Mark
Zuckerberg announced a change to Facebook’s algorithms. Zuckerberg
said he was “changing the goal I give our product teams from focusing
on helping you find relevant content to helping you have more
meaningful social interactions.”188 Facebook would now program its
algorithms to “prioritize posts that spark conversations and meaningful
interactions between people,” and “show these posts higher in [the
user’s] feed.” 189 Prioritized posts would be those “that inspire backand-forth discussion in the comments [and those] you might want to
share and react to.”190
181

Tim Wu, Machine Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1495, 1498 (2013).
Stuart Minor Benjamin, Algorithms and Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1445,
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Amendment. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 342
(2010).
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These public statements indicate the company’s algorithms are
likely to be speech, for two reasons. First, “inspiring back-and-forth
discussion” is at the heart of the marketplace of ideas and selfgovernance theories that guide First Amendment jurisprudence.191
Next, they show that Facebook’s newsfeed algorithms are selective,
satisfying the “choose what to air” prong of the first element of
Benjamin’s speech test. The algorithms analyze user data and, based
on criteria set by Mark Zuckerberg and implemented by Facebook
engineers, select which posts a user will see and in what order.192 The
algorithms also reflect and communicate a pro-community and social
engagement message, satisfying the test’s second element.
Benjamin compares this kind of algorithm to a person who
selects certain news clippings to post on a physical bulletin board.193
Because the bulletin board reflects its creator’s substantive point of
view, it is speech.194 Transferring the bulletin board to the internet and
automating the selection doesn’t change the analysis, because these
steps change “nothing relevant to free speech coverage under the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.”195 Here, because Zuckerberg’s
personal decisions to promote or suppress certain content would be
protected under the First Amendment, Facebook’s algorithms retain
that protection.196
Admittedly, less is known about Facebook’s friend suggestion
algorithm (at issue in Force) than about the newsfeed algorithm
discussed above.197 It’s possible that the friend suggestion algorithm,
191

See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J.
concurring), overruled in part by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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As noted above, this article assumes for the sake of argument that the friend
suggestion algorithm operates as alleged by the plaintiffs in Force. See supra,
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as for the newsfeed algorithm. See supra, notes 188–190 and accompanying
text.
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See Benjamin, supra note 182, at 1465.
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See Emily Stewart, Mark Zuckerberg is Essentially Untouchable at
Facebook,
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2018,
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AM),
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unlike the newsfeed ranking algorithm, might have no basis in
Facebook’s point of view. It could suggest friends based on nonideological factors like geolocation data. If so, the friend suggestion
algorithm might be regulable commercial conduct, not protected
speech.198 But if, as the Force plaintiffs allege, the algorithm identifies
potential Hamas recruits based on shared interests and creates new
friend suggestions based on that information, the friend suggestion
algorithm satisfies Benjamin’s test. The friend suggestion algorithm
“create[s] content” and “select[s] content to present” by taking raw data
about what users are interested in and generating a friend suggestion
consisting of a line of text, picture, and link.199 It selects and promotes
these suggestions to maximize communicative impact. By these
actions, Facebook communicates a message that more social
connection is desirable. Facebook’s friend suggestion algorithm thus
passes Benjamin’s test for algorithmic “speech.”
B. Is algorithmic speech fully protected under the First
Amendment?
Assuming, then, that Facebook’s algorithm is speech, is it
protected by the First Amendment? As discussed above, the Supreme
Court has expansively defined protected speech. Only a few
historically bounded categories of speech, like incitement, true threats,
obscenity, and fighting words, are outside the Amendment’s
protection.200 While some speech posted by Hamas on Facebook may
be incitement or true threats, Facebook’s friend suggestion algorithm’s

Know
Suggestions
Come
From
on
Facebook?,
FACEBOOK
https://www.facebook.com/help/163810437015615 (listing factors Facebook
uses to generate these suggestions).
198
An example of a commercial conduct algorithm is Amazon’s product
suggestions. It can be hard for courts to draw the line between regulable
conduct and speech protected by the First Amendment. Cf. Dana's R.R. Supply
v. Attorney Gen., Fla., 807 F.3d 1235, 1248 (11th Cir. 2015) (Florida’s antisurcharge law was an impermissible speech regulation) with Rowell v.
Pettijohn, 816 F.3d 73, 80 (5th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, judgment
vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1431 (2017) (Texas’ anti-surcharge law was a conduct
regulation only incidentally implicating speech). The Supreme Court resolved
this circuit split in favor of speech. The difference between a conduct
regulation and a speech regulation is whether they promote communication
(Facebook) or commerce (Amazon).
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output is certainly not.201 Facebook’s friend suggestion algorithm falls
into no First Amendment exemption. So, it is protected.202
Next, it’s possible that Facebook’s algorithm might be
“commercial speech.” If so, it would receive second class First
Amendment protection.203 The outer boundaries of commercial speech
are not firmly established. Core commercial speech “does no more than
propose a commercial transaction.”204 But speech that mixes pure
commercial elements like price advertising with non-commercial
elements like education or editorial material may also be commercial
speech.205 In determining whether speech is commercial, the Supreme
Court has considered the function and motivation of the speech as a
whole. If the speaker’s motivation is largely economic, then that speech
may be less easily chilled and may therefore need less First
Amendment protection.206
Where Facebook’s friend suggestion algorithm would land in
this analysis is a bit unclear. No court has yet decided the issue of
whether these kinds of algorithms are speech, much less whether such
algorithms might be entitled to less protection.207 Facebook is free for
users, so its friend suggestions aren’t proposing a classic paid
transaction. The suggestions are not exactly ads for any product or
service provided by Facebook. And the suggestions are strongly related
to promoting conversation and connection, which are issues of public
concern at the core of First Amendment rationales. All of these factors
weigh in favor of full protection for this algorithmic speech. On the
other hand, Facebook’s friend suggestions do arguably propose a
commercial transaction central to the social media business model—
that one user “friend” another, on a platform where increased
201
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connection and engagement means more time spent scrolling and
increased ad revenue. Facebook’s motivation for urging these
connections is certainly economic at base. And arguably, there is no
risk of chilling an algorithm, as it cannot deviate from its
programming.208
Further speculation on this fascinating subject is outside the
scope of this article, but the trend of recent Supreme Court precedent
is to declare speech “commercial” only when it merely proposes a
commercial transaction.209 For this reason alone, it’s highly likely that
Facebook’s algorithmic speech would receive full, non-commercial
protection, as it also communicates a pro-social message. Assuming
therefore that this speech would receive full protection under the First
Amendment, the next section considers constitutional limitations on
the algorithmic material support claims.
C. Does the ATA’s material-support prohibition violate the
First Amendment as applied to Facebook’s friend
suggestion algorithm?
Assuming that Facebook’s friend suggestion algorithm is fully
protected speech, the next relevant question is whether the First
Amendment limits the government’s ability to hold Facebook liable for
that speech under three provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act: §§
2339A, 2339B, and 2333.210 Section 2333 provides a civil cause of
action to people injured by international terrorist acts. Sections 2339A
and B criminalize providing material support or resources to terrorists
and designated foreign terrorist groups. These provisions are not, on
their face, speech regulations. But, as applied to Facebook’s algorithm,
the regulations trigger the First Amendment, because where the only
“conduct” the State seeks to punish “is the fact of communication” the
regulation is one of speech, not of conduct.211 Furthermore, because
these provisions bar only speech that materially supports terrorists (and
not speech that, for example, hinders terrorists), they are “content-
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based” speech regulation.212 Such restrictions receive strict scrutiny.213
Strict scrutiny demands a compelling government interest and that the
challenged regulation is the most narrowly tailed means of achieving
that end.214
The Supreme Court considered an as-applied First Amendment
challenge to § 2339B in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project.215
Holder involved U.S. citizens who “wished to provide support for the
political and humanitarian activities” of two groups, the Kurdistan
Workers’ Party (PKK) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE).216 Both organizations had been designated by the U.S.
Secretary of State as “foreign terrorist organizations.”217 The plaintiffs
wished to support the organizations’ lawful activities by providing
“legal training, and political advocacy.”218 Because § 2339B
criminalized providing such support, they could not. The plaintiffs sued
claiming that § 2339B violated their First Amendment freedom of
speech by “criminaliz[ing this speech] without requiring the
Government to prove that plaintiffs had a specific intent to further the
unlawful ends of those organizations.”219
The Holder Court rejected the government’s arguments that
the material support ban regulated only non-expressive conduct or that
it was a conduct regulation that imposed only incidental burdens on
speech.220 As applied to the plaintiffs, the law banned
communications—training and advocacy—in support of the PKK and
LTTE, acting as a content-based speech restriction. The Court therefore
employed “rigorous” scrutiny.221 First, the government interest
asserted—preventing terrorist attacks—was compelling and “an urgent
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objective of the highest order.”222 The Court next considered whether
the statute needlessly prohibited speech-based support intended to
support the organizations’ peaceful activities.223 In a departure from
ordinary strict scrutiny analysis, the Court deferred to Congress’
determination that a ban on speech-based support to the group was
necessary.224 Given the structural realities of terrorist groups like these,
plaintiffs’ direct support for peaceful activities indirectly supports the
groups’ violent activities. Support, the Court emphasized, was
fungible.225 Given the government’s exceedingly strong interest in
preventing terror attacks and the special competency of the political
branches in evaluating the risks involved, § 2339B as applied was
sufficiently narrow.226
However, the Holder Court emphasized, its decision did not
mean “any future applications of the material-support statute to speech
. . . [would] survive First Amendment scrutiny.”227 “In particular,” the
Court stated, “we in no way suggest that a regulation of independent
speech would pass constitutional muster, even if the Government
[shows] that such speech benefits foreign terrorist organizations.”228
This caveat is particularly relevant to the claims raised in Force. First,
the government’s interest in allowing civil suits is less compelling than
its interest in preventing terror attacks. Second, as applied to
independent speech like Facebook’s, the statute is not a sufficiently
tailored means of achieving this interest.
In the “compelling government interest” prong of the strict
scrutiny analysis, the Force claims might survive but carry less weight
than the interest asserted in Holder. The Holder court noted that the
government’s interest in preventing acts of terrorism was “an urgent
objective of the highest order.”229 And, in Holder, the government was
directly asserting that interest through § 2339B.230 In Force, the
plaintiffs asserted §§ 2339A and B through § 2333, the civil liability
provision.231 The government’s regulatory interest in Force, therefore,
222
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isn’t prevention of terrorist acts, but enabling victims of such attacks to
find justice. This is probably less compelling than preventing the
attacks themselves.
In the “narrowly tailored means” prong of the strict scrutiny
analysis, the ATA’s material support provisions, as applied to the
Force plaintiffs’ claims, are unlikely to survive. Facebook’s algorithm
is independent speech, a restriction of which the Holder Court stated
was undecided by that opinion and indicated was unlikely to
succeed.232 The Holder plaintiffs wanted to work directly with the PKK
and LTTE, training members and advocating on the organization’s
behalf.233 Facebook, in contrast, is not working with Hamas. It deploys
its algorithm to increase use of and engagement with its site. Support
of Hamas is secondary and unintentional.234 If the material support
statute can criminalize such speech, it is dangerously broad.235
Of course, there is a legitimate argument for why prohibiting
civil suits based on independent speech that has the effect of providing
material support is the most narrowly tailored means available.
Facebook is arguably a uniquely powerful market force, so its friend
suggestions may be uniquely effective at providing recruits. Given this,
civil liability might be a necessary means of forcing Facebook to
address the problem, given the government’s limited means to do so
and Facebook’s significant ones. However, this argument will fail.
When national security is at issue, courts are especially reluctant to
allow suits that might undercut the effectiveness of executive
enforcement.236 The government may prefer to shield Facebook from
liability if terrorist groups that communicate via American technology
platforms are easier for U.S. intelligence to monitor. Furthermore,
under strict scrutiny the most narrowly tailored means to achieve the
government’s interest is required. A statute providing that Facebook
may be held liable only for material support it intentionally or directly
provides to Hamas (as, say, a contractor) would be more narrowly
tailored. Unless the Court finds that Congress had no narrower means
of effectively preventing a service like Facebook from providing
material support through its friend suggestion algorithm, the statute
232
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will not survive means analysis. Considering the Holder Court’s
concern about allowing Congress to create unbounded liability for
independent speech that provides support to terrorist organizations, §
2333 thus applied would be struck down as an impermissible regulation
of Facebook’s algorithmic speech.
CONCLUSION
Algorithmic material support claims like those brought in
Force are long shots. As currently written and interpreted by a majority
of courts, § 230(c)(1) provides potent immunity from such claims.
However, given recent calls to reform Section 230, it is possible that
this statutory hurdle may be lowered—or removed entirely.237
Congress has begun considering proposals to reform Section 230.238
237
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Also, the Department of Justice’s Office of the Attorney General
recently issued a review of Section 230 identifying “areas ripe for
reform.”239 Among the Department’s recommendations is “exempting
from immunity specific categories of claims that address particularly
egregious content, including . . . terrorism.”240 Of course,
recommendations from the Office of the Attorney General have no
legal—and possibly no persuasive—effect. But the Department’s
attention to the possible political or legal desirability of a terrorism
carve-out shows that government leaders continue to grapple with the
appropriate balance of legal rights and protections for terror victims
and valuable, powerful internet companies.
But even if the statutory hurdle is lowered or removed, material
support claims based on social media algorithms will remain
challenging. Assuming Facebook’s algorithm is speech, it’s unlikely
the Supreme Court, applying strict scrutiny, would find the material
support statute’s civil liability provision constitutional as applied to
claims based on independent speech like this. And the proximate
causation hurdle presented by the ATA will remain.241
Notwithstanding these obstacles, understanding the hurdles
such claimants face is valuable, especially given the current attention
focused on § 230(c). Understanding exposure under this theory will
help social media companies assess risk and voluntarily structure their
activities—algorithmic or otherwise—to minimize liability.
Understanding the hurdles such claims face can help victims of terrorist
attacks make informed decisions about which claims to pursue and
which to forgo. Understanding the complexities of terrorism claims
against social media companies can inform Congress as it considers
amending Section 230. And finally, understanding this analytical
process can help courts considering the tragic claims of terror victim
plaintiffs navigate the complicated intersecting statutory and
constitutional legal issues they present.
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